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Abstract
We investigated political polarization among the 28284 candidates in the Finnish municipal election who ran for municipal
council in 2012, 2017, or both, and had responded to a Voting Advice Application. Our results revealed political polarization
in terms of both conversion (longitudinal analysis, n = 6643) and recruitment (cross-sectional comparison of first-time candidates,
n = 13054). The populist radical-right Finns Party became even more anti-refugee, and the pro-refugee Green League became
even more pro-refugee. The Finns Party, in particular, has constructed the Green League as their enemies, which could explain
why the Finns Party moved in an anti-environmental direction, as well as the increased issue-alignment between refugee-attitudes
and environmental attitudes. We also observed increased within-party homogeneity in almost all parties. In the discussion,
we focus on the nature of the association between refugee and environmental attitudes.
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Considering the current concern over the polarization of society and of politics, the empirical research on polarization
outside of the US could be considered surprisingly scant. That research has provided ample evidence that the
US political elites have become increasingly polarized over the past five decades (Layman, Carsey, & Horowitz,
2006). The present research investigates polarization in the Finnish political elite. Finland is in many ways a typical
Western European country; the party system is multi-party, and the major European party families are represented,
including a radical-right party and a green party. These two parties, the Finns Party and the Green League, are
the focus of the present research. We chose these parties because Finland, like the rest of Europe, experienced
the so-called European refugee crisis in 2015, and the two parties were already polar opposites in terms of refugee
policy before the crisis.
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Polarization of the political elite occurs when party members (both elected government officials and activists
within the party organization itself) grow more internally homogenous on policy positions and more divergent rel-
ative to members of other parties (Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008). Employing both longitudinal and cross-sectional
data collected by the Voting Advice Application (VAA) of the Finnish National Broadcast Company (Yle), we as-
sessed the attitudes of candidates in the Finnish municipal elections in 2012 and again in 2017. In our pre-registered
hypotheses, we expected candidates of the populist radical-right Finns Party (FP) and their adversary, the pro-
refugee Green League (whom we will occasionally refer to as “Greens”), to become even more polarized, both
due to radicalization of old candidates and recruitment of more extreme candidates.
Elite and Mass Polarization in the US
The vast majority of the research on polarization has been conducted in the US. This research very clearly shows
a division between elite and mass polarization. The two political parties in the US started to move further apart in
the early 1970s, and there is now general consensus that parties’ leaders and coalitions, including also grass-root
activists, have during the last fifty years become both increasingly likely to take extreme positions on a broad set
of political issues (single issue radicalization) and more consistently liberal or consistently conservative (issue
alignment; for reviews, see Layman & Carsey, 2000; Layman et al., 2006; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006;
Webster & Abramowitz, 2017). Some researchers consider contemporary party polarization in the US an (unin-
tended) consequence of institutional changes (Burden, 2001), whereas others consider it a response to mass
polarization (for a discussion, see Layman et al., 2006).
The current debate on mass polarization in the US has itself been characterized as polarized, with one side arguing
that the US is in the midst of a culture war, and the other arguing that such claims are exaggerations. Reviewing
the debate and providing new empirical evidence, Lelkes (2016) argued that both sides could, in theory, be right,
depending on how polarization is defined. However, he went on to show the mass public has not become more
radicalized on single issues, nor has it becomemore consistent in terms of increased issue alignment. Polarization
has increased in the sense that partisans now perceive the country as more polarized and dislike one another
more. That is, despite the polarization of the US political elite, American public opinion has remained very stable,
or even become more moderate on most political issues, with attitudes towards only few single issues (e.g.
abortion) becoming more radicalized (for another review, see Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008). Moreover, there is
no evidence of increased alignment between single issue; that is, attitude constraint has remained essentially
stable and low, with no signs of higher ideological coherence (Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008; Lelkes, 2016).
Migration and Polarization of the European Political Elite?
In this study, we set out to investigate polarization of refugee attitudes in the wake of the so-called “refugee crisis”
or “migrant crisis” of 2015 (referred to as the “refugee crisis” from here on). The Syrian exodus in 2015 created a
crisis in Europe and threw the European asylum system into chaos. This event led to an increasingly polarized
debate over the improvised responses (Hatton, 2017). The European press generally framed Syrian refugees’
arrival to Europe as a crisis (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2016). Initial sympathy towards the refugees was in parts
of the population quickly replaced by hostility and hate speech. Across Europe, the refugees were portrayed by
the press as dangerous outsiders. The negative press coverage of immigration-related events and the rise of far-
right populist parties across Europe (Golder, 2016; Mudde, 2007) could have been expected to reflect an increas-
ingly anti-immigration public opinion.
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However, European Social Survey data suggest that overall public attitudes towards refugees (Hatton, 2016) and
immigrants (Heath & Richards, 2016) remained relatively stable after 2015. But focusing on average scores could
mask increasing group differences. Those with the strongest attitudes on either side could be moving further away
from each other. Supporting this idea, mass attitudes towards immigration in the urban vs. rural areas of the UK
are increasingly polarizing (Duffy, Kaur-Ballagan, & Gottfried, 2015). More pertinent to the present research, far-
right populist parties have successfully used the “refugee crisis” to build their support and win elections across
Europe (Golder, 2016). Mirroring the situation in the US, it could thus be that the political elite is becoming increas-
ingly polarized, despite the mass public remaining relatively stable in their average attitudes.
Polarization in Finland
Besides single issue polarization, in which possible changes in means scores and variances on a single issue
indicate polarization in the sense of radicalization (Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008), we also investigated polarization
across different issues. People’s ideological distance depends not only on the level of radicalization of their
opinions but also on the extent to which such opinions are correlated with each other—this type of polarization
has been referred to as issue alignment (Baldassarri & Gelman, 2008) or constraint (Converse, 1964). Specifically,
besides focusing on the polarization of refugee attitudes (single issue radicalization), we will investigate the conjoint
polarization of attitudes towards refugees and towards the environment (increased issue alignment). To explain
why we focus on environmental attitudes, a brief overview of the Finnish political context is necessary.
The nationalist-populist Finns Party gained a historic victory in Finland’s parliamentary elections in spring 2011.
The parliamentary group, which had consisted of 5 members after the 2007 elections, now suddenly grew to 39
members. At the same time, the party fractured the traditional configuration of three main parties and became the
third-largest party in the Parliament. The success of this party continued in the 2015 elections with the Finns
Party rising to become Finland’s second largest surpassing the votes of the traditional mass parties, namely the
National Coalition Party (NCP) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). As a result, the Finns Party entered gov-
ernment with the Centre Party Finland (CPF) and the NCP (Arter, 2015). The Finns Party belongs to the same
party family as other populist radical-right parties in Nordic Europe (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). The most important
feature of these parties is their authoritarian position on sociocultural issues (Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Mudde,
2007; Rydgren, 2005). This position includes first and foremost an exclusionist and ethnically based form of na-
tionalism. The nation-state should remain as culturally and ethnically homogenous as possible, which means that
the influx of refugees and in some occasions their rights must be limited (Hlousek & Kopecek, 2010; Kitschelt,
2007). The Chapel Hill Expert Survey, which describes policy positions of national political parties in the EU,
shows that the Finns Party, as compared to other Finnish parties, is by far the toughest on immigration policy and
the most hostile towards multiculturalism.
The Green League, with its roots in a social movement, gained parliamentary representation in the late 1980s.
They were determined not to become a single-issue party, but adopted a range of liberal positions on social issues
such as refugee, women’s rights and lifestyle choices, supported pacifist foreign policies, and took leftist positions
on many core economic issues. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey shows that, as compared to other Finnish parties,
the Greens have from 2006 onward to 2014 been the most welcoming in terms of immigration policy and the
strongest proponent of multiculturalism. Moreover, the immigration topic has been very salient to the Greens, with
only the Finns Party giving more weight to immigration issues in their policy program.
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Populist parties tend to define their opponents more precisely than their own group. They employ black-and-white
rhetoric along with vague expressions and stereotypes, with the aim of creating the (imaginary) ‘other’ that is set
against (the likewise imaginary) ‘us’ (Mudde, 2007; Wiberg, 2011). The Finns Party referred to the SDP, the CPF
and the NCP as ‘old cartel parties’ that are all alike in a culture of ‘Finnish-style consensus politics’, and one of
their key talking points was smashing the domination of these parties, which together had dominated politics for
over 30 years (Arter, 2011). We will refer to these three parties as the ‘three large parties’.
However, the ideal adversary and scapegoat (an essential element of populist othering; Wodak, 2015) of the
Finns Party were the similarly sized Greens. A lot of the initial popularity of the Finns Party rested on the verbally
talented chairman Timo Soini, and the party has been described as typical entrepreneurial party tied around a
long-time charismatic leader (Arter & Kestilä-Kekkonen, 2014). In Soini’s writings, the Greens represented everything
that the Finns Party was not, and vice versa. The Greens were described as arrogant elitists who lived in ivory
towers and believed themselves to be superior to others (Niemi, 2013). By contrast, the Finns Party sought to
represent the ‘ordinary’ Finnish man on the street, and his (or her) interests and rights, such as motoring, traveling
abroad, and eating meat (Niemi, 2013). Also, other key politicians in the Finns Party came to describe the Greens
as the unpatriotic and hateful enemy within (Sakki & Pettersson, 2016). In the wake of the “refugee crisis”, the
Finns Party policy positions became more extreme. They went into the 2015 parliamentary elections with a policy
program that was by many legal experts considered racist and anti-constitutional in that it portrayed migrants as
being less valuable and more problematic than the native population (Kuisma & Nygård, 2017).
Regarding both refugee attitudes and attitudes towards the environment, the Finns Party and the Greens are polar
opposites (Koivula, Koiranen, Saarinen, & Keipi, 2019). Almost 90% of the members of the Finns Party view
refugees as an important societal risk, whereas above 60% of Green League members do not view refugees as
an important risk. Regarding attitudes towards the environment, almost 100% of the Greens view environmental
problems as a societal risk, whereas the corresponding number among Finns Party members is around 60%. On
both attitude items, members of the ‘three large parties’ are in between the FP and the Greens.
The Finnish electoral system provides a unique, or at least rare, context in which to study the actual attitudes of
electoral candidates (for an overview of the Finnish electoral system, see von Schoultz, 2018). Open-list propor-
tional representation with mandatory preferential voting has generated a multi-party system which involves a high
degree of both interparty competition (due to proportional representation) and intraparty competition (due to
wholly open lists andmandatory preferential voting). Although VAAs are an important part of the electoral campaigns
also in other Western European countries, such as the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland, the role of VAAs
is accentuated in the Finnish contexts by the fully open lists. The VAAs not only recommends a party, but also
recommends individual candidates based on the fit between the candidate’s responses and the person’s responses
to the voting application. The fully open lists make it important for candidates to attract personal votes, and the
VAAs should be ideally suited for this purpose. Testifying to the importance of VAAs, in the previous national
elections (Finnish parliamentary elections 2015), around half of those who voted had used VAAs and around half
of them said that the results had influenced their decision on whom to vote (Borg, 2015). I.e., VAAs matter a lot
in the Finnish electoral context.
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The increased inflow of refugees and the subsequent increased tension between political parties was expected
to increase between-party opinion differences. Comparing the same candidates’ scores in 2012 and in 2017, we
expected the average change scores in the Finns Party to indicate increasingly negative attitudes towards refugees,
and the opposite pattern to emerge in the Green League (pre-registered as H1).
Increased Issue Alignment (Hypothesis 2)
We expected an increased polarization in terms of issue alignment. More specifically, we expected the correlation
between being pro-refugee and being pro-environment to increase. That is, in wake of the “refugee crisis” and
the headline-grabbing rivalry between the Finns Party and the Green League, we expected candidates to learn
“what goes with what” and apply this to their own political attitudes (e.g., Carmines & Stimson, 1981; Zaller, 1992).
However, we expected this type of polarization in terms of issue alignment to occur only in the ‘three large parties’
(this was pre-registered as H2). Our reasoning was that the alignment between refugee and environmental attitudes
would, when looking at Finns Party and Green League candidates, already be very high in 2012, with little room
for the correlation to increase and with little within-party variance on either refugee or environmental issues (note
that we also did not expect environmental attitudes to change in either the Finns Party or the Green League).
However, we expected the Finns Party’s ownership of the public policy debates on immigration and refugee intake,
and their general domination of the media landscape (Horsti, 2015; Kuisma &Nygård, 2017) to influence candidates
from the catch-all ‘three large parties’. I.e., we expected them to take cues regarding “what goes with what” and
come to associate certain refugee attitudes with certain environmental attitudes - those that adopted more pro-
refugee attitudes were expected to also adopt more pro-environmental attitudes, and vice versa.
Replacement (Hypothesis 3)
Fleisher and Bond (2004) argued that polarization was caused not only by conversion (as tested by H1) but also
by replacement. To investigate replacement, we compared first-time candidates in 2017 with first-time candidates
in 2012. We expected first-time candidates for the Finns Party and the Green League to be more extreme in their
refugee attitudes at the latter elections (pre-registered as H3).
Method
Pre-Registration
The hypotheses and the analysis plan of this study were pre-registered by the authors before conducting the
study. The pre-registration can be found at https://osf.io/2zkcf/. Pre-registered analysis plan included decisions
regarding the data preparations, variable transformations, data-analytical choices, and statistical inference, and
these decisions were all made before any analyses involving the attitude variables were run.
Note that the preregistered hypotheses H1 and H3 concerned the Finns Party and the Green League, and H2
concerned the three catch-all parties, the SDP, the CPF, and the NCP. Nevertheless, we ran all analyses for all
parties that had representatives in the Finnish parliament in 2017, thus including also themoremarginal Left Alliance
(around 10% of the vote), Christian Democrats (3%), and Swedish People’s Party of Finland (5%). We excluded
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fringe candidates running as independent or running for marginal parties (less than 5% of all candidates). Initial
inspection of the results led to exploratory analyses on gender differences, between-party differences in the
strength of polarization, and possible increases in within-group homogeneity.
Sample and Procedure
The total sample consisted of those 28284 (43.78% women) candidates in the Finnish municipal election who ran
for municipal council in 2012, 2017, or both, and had completed the VAA hosted by the Finnish National Broad-
casting company (Yle) on at least one of these two occasions. The municipal council is the highest decision-
making body at the municipal level. It decides on the municipal budget, including municipal income tax rate, as
well as deciding on city-planning and organizing municipal services and administration. Municipalities are the
lowest level of government in Finland but they are more important than in most countries, being responsible for
the provision of services such as health care and education. Municipal elections take place every four years.
The longitudinal sample, which is used to test H1 and H2, is different from the sample of first-time candidates
used to test H3. The longitudinal sample included those who had run in the 2012 elections, but excluded those
had run only in 2017 (newcomers). Thus, for the longitudinal examination, participants were those 18699 candidates
in the Finnish 2012 municipal elections who had completed the Yle VAA. Of these participants, 6643 (35.53%)
were also candidates in 2017 and had completed the Yle VAA on both occasions. In the comparisons of first-time
candidates, those running for the first time in 2012 (n = 7738) were compared with those who were running for
the first time in 2017 (n = 5316).
Measures
Attitudes
Acceptance of refugees was assessed by the item "My municipality must accommodate refugees who have been
granted asylum in Finland." [Oman kuntani tulee ottaa vastaan suomesta turvapaikan saaneita pakolaisia] in 2012
and with the item “My municipality must accommodate people who have been granted asylum in Finland." [Oman
kuntani tulee ottaa vastaan suomesta turvapaikan saaneita] in 2017. That is, the items differed in that the 2012
VAA item referred to those who had been granted asylum as “refugees”, whereas this term was not included in
2017. However, the meaning of the items is exactly equivalent (the possible implications of this change are dis-
cussed below). For the descriptive statistics of all items, both within and across parties, see Tables S01-S11 in
the SOM.
Attitude towards the environment was assessed with the item "To allow for the creation of jobs, my municipality
can take a more relaxed stance towards the importance of nature environmental values” [Ympäristö- ja luontoar-
voista voidaan kunnassani joustaa, jos siten voidaan lisätä työpaikkoja] both in 2012 and 2017. The itemwas reverse
scored, so that higher scores indicated a more pro-environmental view.
The items were originally responded to on a 5-point scale (0 = completely agree, 1 = somewhat agree, 2 = don’t
know / dismiss the item, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = completely disagree). (In the pre-registration, there is a
typing error that implies that the scales did not include the disagree options, but this mistake is corrected here.)
The middle option (2 = don’t know / dismiss the item) was coded as missing (participants were not excluded from
the analysis due to missing responses), 1 was coded 2, and 0 was coded 1. Thus, the transformed items were
on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (completely agree) to 4 (completely disagree).
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2020, Vol. 8(1), 173–197
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v8i1.1236
Polarization Politics 178
The attitude measures were all single-item measures, making it impossible to directly estimate their reliability.
However, a subset of those participants for whom we had 2017 data (n = 3721), had also provided answers to
the VAA hosted by the largest Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (HS). Some of the items in the HS VAA
conceptually overlapped with the Yle items that we employed and the high correlations between these items
suggested that our measures, although only single items, could be trusted (see SOM for reliability analyses).
Covariates and Attrition
As outlined in the pre-registration, when testing our hypotheses we wanted to control for a set of important demo-
graphic covariates. These were gender, age, education (binary coded, 0 = lower than Bachelor’s degree, 1 = at
least Bachelor’s degree,), political experience (binary coded, 0 = first-time candidate in 2012, 1 = not a first-time
candidate in 2012), and income (binary coded, below average = 0, above average = 1). For the longitudinal
analyses, all covariates except income (which was only available in the 2017 data) were taken from the 2012
dataset. To test differences between first-time candidates in 2012 and 2017, gender, age, and education, obtained
from the respective datasets, were used as covariates. Regarding attrition, there were no general differences
between those who had only 2012 data available and those that had both 2012 and 2017 data available (see
SOM for attrition analyses).
Data Analytic Strategy
For confirmatory hypothesis testing of H1 and H2, a bivariate multigroup latent change score model was constructed
within the structural equation modeling framework (see Figure 1). Specifically, for each of the eight parties, we
constructed a two-wave latent change score model in which the observed attitude variables (2012 and 2017)
loaded on the baseline latent variable and the 2017 attitude item loaded on the latent change score variable (Little,
Bovaird, & Slegers, 2006). The covariation between the latent baseline and change variables was included in the
model.
Mean-level change in the attitude of an average candidate of each party (H1) was investigated with the party-
specific means of the latent change score variables (α2 in Figure 1). The model was bivariate, meaning that an
identical change score model was run simultaneously for refugee and environmental attitudes within the same
structural equation model. This allowed for the estimation of the party-specific correlation between changes of
the two attitudes (ψ2 in Figure 1), indicating within-party issue alignment (H2). The correlation between the baseline
values on both attitudes was also estimated (ψ1). No between-party constraints were imposed, but for testing
Hypothesis 2, aggregate parameter estimates were investigated instead of party-specific estimates. Gender, age,
education, income, and political experience were entered as covariates (this was done by regressions the observed
attitude scores on them). Covariates were time invariant and centered around the party means. As pointed out to
us in the review phase of this manuscript, our pre-registered method for testing Hypothesis 2 presupposes that
there is a correlation between refugee and environmental attitudes in 2017, and significant variance in change
scores. These requirements were met (for all descriptive statistics, including Pearson and Spearman correlations
at both stages of data collection, within and across parties, and correlated change scores, see Tables S01 to S12
in the SOM).i
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Figure 1. Two-Wave Latent Change Score Model.
For Hypothesis 3, a bivariate model was constructed within the framework of structural equation modeling, In this
model, year (coded −0.5 for 2012 and 0.5 for 2017) predicted observed scores on refugee and environmental at-
titudes, whilst controlling for gender, age, education, and income. The covariance between the two attitude items
was also modeled.
Structural equation modeling was done with the lavaan –package (Rosseel, 2012) of R (R Core Team, 2017).
The estimation procedure for all structural equation models was full information maximum likelihood, which allows
for missing data. The analysis script used for obtaining the results and the analysis output including all the results
and all data are made freely available (see the Supplementary Materials section). Local and national ethics
guidelines exempt this type of open access public data from ethics approval.ii
For each hypothesis, the type-I error rate (alpha) was set at .05. For possible exploratory examinations, of which
some were mentioned in the preregistration, we used family-wise adjustment of the type-I error rate, so that alpha
remained at .05 for the entire family of m significance tests (Holm, 1979). The family size m of each exploratory
analysis is mentioned in the results.
Statistical Power
The power analysis script and output can be freely accessed online (see the Supplementary Materials section).
For Hypothesis 1, the power to detect change of the magnitude of d = .10 for a single party was above .88 with
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type-I error rate (alpha) set at .05 with the expected sample sizes for the relevant parties (around n = 600 for
longitudinal data without missing values). In addition, power to detect differences in change between two parties
(d = .20) in conjunction with single party changes (d = .10 each, opposite direction) was above .80 with alpha set
at .05.
For Hypothesis 2, the sensitivity to detect difference in the magnitudes of change score correlations between two
groups of parties was calculated with G*Power. The sample sizes for these aggregated groups were assumed to
be 1201 (Finns Party and GL) and 4089 (CPF, NCP, SDP). With these sample sizes, we had sensitivity to detect
small (Cohen’s q = .118) differences in the correlations with .95 power and alpha set at .05.
For Hypothesis 3, the number of Finns Party first-time candidates in 2012 (n = 663) and 2017 (n = 404), and the
number of Green League first-time candidates in 2012 (n = 825) and 2017 (n = 1159), gave us .80 power to detect
differences of the magnitude d = .15-.16, with type-I error set at .05.
Results
Model Fit
Multigroup bivariate latent change score model without (CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .02, SRMR = .02) and with covariates
(CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .01) showed good fit to the data. Hypothesis 1 and 2 are tested from the
model with covariates.
Hypothesis 1: Mean-Level Polarization
Confirmatory Results
For refugee attitude, descriptive statistics for the longitudinal sample and the standardizedmean differences between
2012 and 2017 are presented in Table 1. Supporting the predicted polarization (H1) Finns Party candidates were
less accepting of refugees in 2017 (M = 1.60, SD = 0.78) than they were in 2012 (M = 1.96, SD = 0.88), α2 =
−0.36, z = −11.54, p < .001, Hedges’ g (calculated with pooled SD across all parties and measurements) = −0.48.
Also consistent with our first hypothesis, Green League candidates were more accepting of refugees in 2017 (M =
3.75, SD = 0.49) than they were in 2012 (M = 3.61, SD = 0.58), α2 = 0.15, z = 7.06, p < .001, g = 0.19. The difference
between the change scores was also statistically significant, α2GL − α2FP = 0.51, z = 13.51, p < .001, confirming
the expected mean-level polarization between the Finns Party and the Green League. This polarization was
stronger in the Finns Party, α2GL + α2FP = −0.22, z = −5.74, p < .001. Change scores in refugee attitudes for all
parties are depicted in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Longitudinal change 2012-2017 in refugee and environmental attitudes.
Exploratory Results
All other parties, except the Finns (m = 6) showed increased acceptance of refugees (see Table 1). The effect
sizes ranged from g = 0.14 (Christian Democrats) to g = 0.49 (Swedish People’s Party).
The multigroup bivariate latent change score model was also used to test whether environmental attitudes changed
from 2012 to 2017 (m = 8). Descriptive statistics and standardized mean-level changes in environmental attitudes
are presented in Table 2. Change scores for all parties in environmental attitudes are also shown in Figure 2.
Candidates from three parties revealed a decrease in pro-environmental attitudes from 2012 to 2017, the Finns
Party (M = 2.61, SD = 0.87 vs. M = 2.43, SD = 0.81; α2 = −0.20, z = −6.09, p < .001, g = −0.25), the Center Party
(M = 2.89, SD = 0.73 vs. M = 2.80, SD = 0.72; α2 = −0.08, z = −4.28, p < .001, g = −0.12), and the National
Coalition Party (M = 2.84, SD = 0.77 vs. M = 2.77, SD = 0.73; α2 = −0.08, z = −4.28, p < .001, g = −0.10).
After adjusting for family-wise error rate for the associations between covariates and the latent baseline and
change scores (five covariates × eight parties gave family size m = 40), for each latent variable in the multigroup
bivariate latent change score model (covariates in this version of the model predicted the latent variable, not ob-
served variables, as in the previous model), none of the covariates were, in any party, statistically significantly
associated with latent change scores for either refugee (for all estimates, p > .090) or environmental attitudes (p
> .294). However, demographic variables did predict some baseline mean-levels. Education was positively asso-
ciated with mean-level pro-refugee attitudes (baseline latent factor) in the Centre Party Finland (standardized re-
gression coefficient β = .15), Finns Party (β = .10), Green League (β = .17), Left Alliance (β = .27), National
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Coalition Party (β = .14), and Social Democratic Party (β = .23). Age was positively associated with pro-refugee
attitudes in the Centre Party Finland (β = .06) and the Finns Party (β = .20). In addition, political experience was
negatively associated with a pro-refugee attitude in the National Coalition Party (β = −.06).
Table 1









1409National Coalition Party .001<.001<.360.750.013.780.752
1177Social Democratic Party .001<.001<.310.700.283.780.053
279Swedish People's Party .001<.001<.490.570.703.720.343
Note. n = sample size for stayers in each party (data available from 2012 and 2017) for which the descriptive statistics and standardized mean
difference g were calculated. For g, pooled standard deviation across all parties and measurement waves was used. Statistical tests for the
mean difference were obtained from the multi-group latent change score models. adj. p = Holm adjusted p-values.
Table 2









1409National Coalition Party .001<.001<.10-0.730.772.770.842
1177Social Democratic Party .0001.857.02-0.690.073.760.083
279Swedish People's Party .0001.673.07-0.770.113.790.163
Note. n = sample size for stayers in each party (data available from 2012 and 2017) for which the descriptive statistics and standardized mean
difference g were calculated. For g, pooled standard deviation across all parties and measurement waves was used. Statistical tests for the
mean difference were obtained from the multi-group latent change score models. adj. p = Holm adjusted p-values.
Regarding the associations between demographic variables and environmental attitudes, women candidates
scored higher in environmental attitudes in the Centre Party Finland (β = .17), Christian Democrats (β = .12),
Finns Party (β = .15), National Coalition Party (β = .13), Social Democratic Party (β = .10), and Swedish People’s
Party (β = .19). Education was also positively associated with environmental attitudes in the Centre Party Finland
(β = .08), Left Alliance (β = .18), National Coalition Party (β = .09), and Social Democratic Party (β = .08). In addition,
age was negatively associated with environmental attitudes in the Left Alliance (β = −.15), and political experience
was negatively associated with environmental attitudes in the Finns Party (β = −.08) and the National Coalition
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Party (β = −.06). The total amount of variance explained by the covariates ranged, across parties, from R2 =.024
to R2 = .088 for refugee attitudes, and from R2 = .016 to R2 = .062 for environmental attitudes.
Inspection of Tables 1 and 2 suggested to us that the party-specific variances of refugee attitudes could be indicative
of within-party homogenization (in Tables 1 and 2, the observed scores in 2017 tend to have lower standard devi-
ations than the observed scores in 2012). To explore this, an additional structural equation model without latent
baseline and change variables was constructed for refugee and environmental attitudes. In this model, the observed
variables at both 2012 and 2017 were regressed on the covariates and were also allowed to covary with each
other. The variance estimates (residualized for the covariates) for these variables were then compared over time
for each party, and these comparisons were adjusted to set the family-wise error rate at .05 (m = 8 for both attitudes).
All parties but the Centre Party Finland and the Christian Democrats had lower variance in refugee attitudes in
2017 than in 2012 (for all comparisons, adjusted p < .002). Similarly, all but Centre Party, Christian Democrats,
and Swedish People’s Party had lower variance in environmental attitudes in 2017 than in 2012 (for all comparisons,
adjusted p < .035). These results indicate that most parties have polarized in terms of within-party homogenization
regarding both refugee and environmental attitudes.
Hypothesis 2: Issue Alignment Polarization
Confirmatory Results
Contrary to expectations (Hypothesis 2), change in refugee attitudes was not, in the three ‘large parties’, the
Centre Party, National Coalition Party, and Social Democratic Party, aligned with changes in environmental attitudes
(standardized aggregate estimate of correlated change ψ2 = −.02, z = −1.79, p = .073). However, these changes
were aligned in the Finns Party and the Green League (ψ2 = .05, z = 2.17, p = .030). The difference in issue
alignment was also statistically significant between the two groups of compared parties (ψ2Centre+Coalition+Social
Democrats − ψ2Finns+Green League = −0.04, z = 2.77, p = .006). Among Finns Party and Green League candidates, those
who from 2012 to 2017 became more anti-refugee also became more anti-environment, and vice versa.
The means and SDs for each attitude are included in Tables S01-S11 of the Supplementary Online Material
(SOM), as well as the distributions of the response frequencies for each item across and within parties (these reveal
both skew and kurtosis, which is to be expected as the party line will influence individual candidates). We also
report both Pearson and Spearman correlations for all items across and within parties and the longitudinal corre-
lations between the two attitudes. To demonstrate the superiority of tests of change scores using SEM compared
to examining correlations, we also run a simulation study (SOM). Test from change scores had more statistical
power to detect the simulated change because the change score model controls for longitudinal stability. Also,
SEM can better deal with missing values, as well as with the possibility that attrition could be correlated with co-
variates.
Exploratory Results
Correlated change between refugee and environmental attitudes was also estimated separately for each of the
eight parties (m = 8). None of the correlated change parameters showed issue alignment within single parties
(the correlation estimates ranged from ψ2 = −.09 to ψ2 = .06, for all parties, ps > .269).
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Within-party correlations between refugee and environmental attitudes were examined from the correlations between
the latent baseline factors. In all parties (m = 8), these attitudes were correlated with each other (for each party,
adjusted p < .007). Correlations ranged from ψ1 = .08 (Christian Democrats) to ψ1 = .25 (Left Alliance).
We also explored the possibility that the interpretation of the results would be different if the correlated changes
were estimated from combined data instead of aggregating the estimates across party-specific models. We ran
an additional model wherein there were only two groups, consisting of Centre Party, National Coalition and Social
Democratic party, and Green League and Finns Party, respectively. Only correlations between the attitudes (ad-
justed for the covariates) were of interest in this model that showed good fit to the data (CFI = 1.00, RMSEA =
.02, SRMR = .01). Regarding our hypothesis (H2), we were correct in expecting that in the “old-parties”, refugee
and environmental attitudes would be only weakly correlated at the baseline (ψ1 = .15, z = 17.75, p < .001). Nev-
ertheless, changes in these attitudes were not significantly correlated (ψ2 = −.02, z = −1.41, p = .158) - increased
issue alignment did not occur despite their being ample room for it. We were also correct in expecting that among
the Finns Party and Green League, refugee and environmental attitudes would already be highly correlated in
2012 (ψ1 = .52, z = 25.51, p < .001). However, contrary to expectations, there was still room for the correlation to
grow even stronger, with correlated change scores indicative of even higher correlations in 2017 (ψ2 = .21, z =
7.91, p < .001).
Hypothesis 3: First-Time Candidate Polarization
Confirmatory Results
First-time candidates refugee attitudes are presented in Table 3. As predicted, first-time Finns Party candidates
were more anti-refugee in 2017 (M = 1.65, SD = 0.81) than in 2012 (M = 1.97, SD = 0.85; byear = −0.31, z = −6.19,
p < .001, g = −0.41). Green League candidates revealed the opposite pattern, with first-time candidates being
more pro-refugee in 2017 (M = 3.66, SD = 0.59) than in 2012 (M = 3.60, SD = 0.56), byear = 0.06, z = 1.99, p =
.046, g = 0.08).
Table 3









9371619National Coalition Party .006.001.180.860.962.790.822
7311041Social Democratic Party .343.204.080.820.123.800.063
268320Swedish People's Party .001<.001<.360.620.603.730.323
Note. n = sample sizes of newcomers. For standardized mean difference g, pooled standard deviation across all newcomer groups was used.
Statistical tests for the mean difference were obtained from the multi-group structural equation model where gender, age, education, and income
were controlled. adj. p = Holm adjusted p-values.
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Exploratory Results
Comparison of the above estimates further revealed that polarization in terms of the extremity of refugee attitudes
among first-time candidates was stronger in the Finns Party than in the Green League (byear_Green League − byear_Finns
Party = −0.25, z = −4.25, p < .001). Concerning the parties (m = 6) not included in hypothesis 3, first time candidates
for the Christian Democrats (g = 0.21), National Coalition Party (g = 0.17), and Swedish People’s Party (g = 0.36)
were more pro-refugee in 2017 than in 2012. Regarding environmental attitude, there were no differences between
2012 and 2017 first-time candidates (for all parties, p-values adjusted with m = 8 were > .130, see Table 4).
Table 4










9371619National Coalition Party .606.152.05-.760.892.800.932
7311041Social Democratic Party .135.017.13.740.163.800.063
268320Swedish People's Party .180.026.19.760.253.800.113
Note. n = sample sizes of newcomers. For standardized mean difference g, pooled standard deviation across all newcomer groups was used.
Statistical tests for the mean difference were obtained from the multi-group structural equation model where gender, age, education, and income
were controlled. adj. p = Holm adjusted p-values.
Discussion
We pre-registered three hypotheses for the present research. Two of them were confirmed. As expected (Hypoth-
esis 1), our longitudinal results showed that candidates of the Finns Party (initially the most anti-refugee party)
and the Green League (initially the most pro-refugee party) had, from 2012 to 2017, become even more extreme
in their attitudes towards refugees. Also as expected (Hypothesis 3), first time-candidates of both parties were,
in terms of refugee attitudes, also more extreme in 2017 than in 2012. Both of our hypothesis concerning single
issues polarization were thus confirmed.
Regarding polarization in terms of issue alignment, we expected the Finns Party’s ownership of the public policy
debates on immigration and refugee intake, and their general domination of the media landscape (Horsti, 2015;
Kuisma & Nygård, 2017), in which they defined themselves as everything that the Greens were not, to cause a
stronger correlation between refugee and environmental attitudes. More specifically, candidates from the ‘three
large parties’ were expected to take cues from this discourse and learn what refugee attitudes go with what envi-
ronmental attitudes. However, we did not expect increased issue alignment among Finns Party and Green League
candidates, as these attitudes were in these parties expected to be strongly correlated already in 2012. Contrary
to these expectations (Hypothesis 2), we found increased issue alignment among the Finns Party and Green
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League candidates. In retrospect, this does not seem surprising. Both parties did polarize from 2012 to 2017, both
through conversion and replacement, and there was enough variance among candidates for issue alignment to
increase. I.e., those candidates who became more extreme in their refugee attitudes also became more extreme
in their environmental attitudes. By contrast, candidates from the ‘three large parties’ were not affected. In the
terminology employed by Lelkes (2016), we observed both increased ideological divergence (between parties)
and increased ideological consistency (within parties) in the two parties that already prior to the 2015 ”refugee
crisis” had the most extreme attitudes on refugees.
Regarding the exploratory results that emerged in the process of data analysis, the most important was the increase
in within-party homogeneity, both for refugee attitudes (seven parties out of eight) and for environmental attitudes
(five parties out of eight). Candidates thus became more internally homogenous, a form of polarization that has
been referred to as increased group consensus (for an analysis of many different forms of polarization, many of
which are not touched upon in the present paper, see Bramson et al., 2017). Another interesting result was that
candidates from not only the Finns Party, but also two of the ‘three large parties’; that is, the National Coalition
Party and the Center Party Finland, who formed the government in 2015 together with the Finns Party, attributed
less importance to the environment in 2017 as compared to 2012. Due to the increased public awareness of climate
change, we would not have expected any party to move, on average, in a more anti-environmental direction. Fi-
nally, it should be noted that in the longitudinal data all parties except the Finns Party showed increased acceptance
of refugees, and that also first-time candidates tended to be more pro-refugee in 2017 than in 2012.
Methodological Limitations
Perhaps the most obvious limitation of the present research was our reliance on single item measures. This issue
could, to some extent, be addressed with data from a subsample of candidates who had completed an independent
VAA that included conceptually similar measures. Although the correlations with these independent measures
were high, these independent measures were also single item and relatively similar in scope (e.g., the items as-
sessing attitudes towards refugees all dealt with municipal issues). Previous research on migration attitudes has
employed scales measuring, for instance, general attitude towards immigration (Karreth, Singh, & Stojek, 2015),
attitudes towards immigration policy (Berg, 2009), readiness to accept immigrants (Masso, 2009), construction
of symbolic boundaries towards immigrants (Bail, 2008), anti-foreigner sentiment (DeWaard, 2015), nationalist
inclusion and exclusion criteria (Alexseev, 2015), racism and xenophobia (Leong & Ward, 2006), and perceived
social distances towards migrant groups (Hipp & Boessen, 2012). Similarly, environmental attitudes have been
argued to be multi-dimensional and hierarchical, with a popular questionnaire encompassing as many as twelve
different scales, measuring constructs such as environmental threat, ecocentric concern, conservation motivated
by anthropocentric concern, and human utilization of nature (Milfont & Duckitt, 2010). Given the plethora of different
approaches to conceptualizing and measuring both migration and environmental attitudes, it is clear that single
items measures, such as those that we employed, cannot capture the breadth of the topics or constructs. More
studies using multi-dimensional scales are called for.
Arguably even more disconcerting that our reliance on single items is that the acceptance of refugees was in 2012
assessed by the item "My municipality must accommodate refugees who have been granted asylum in Finland"
and in 2017 with the item “My municipality must accommodate people who have been granted asylum in Finland”.
That is, the word “refugee” was in 2017 replaced by the word “people”. Refugees are defined by the 1951 Refugee
Convention as persons who have been displaced from their country of origin owing to a ‘well-founded fear of
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persecution’. Asylum seekers are those that are in the process of applying for refugee status in another country.
Everyone that has been granted asylum is thus a refugee, meaning that these expressions refer to exactly the
same people. Nevertheless, they could invoke different associations in the candidate's mind. Moreover, the word
"refugees" could in some candidates invoke associations of threat or public nuisance, whereas others might have
associations of pity and charity. And these associations could differ between candidates and parties. We believe
that the change in wording may have attenuated some of the observed results. Candidates opposing refugees
would most likely have more negative associations to “refugees” than to “people”, suggesting that the change in
wording from the former (2012 elections) to the latter (2017 elections) could have caused their responses to move
towards a more neutral midpoint. Mirroring this, candidates for whom the word “refugees” invoked positive asso-
ciations would, when “refugees” was replaced by “people”, also be expected to have become more neutral in their
responses. The change in wording could thus have attenuated the increased polarization that we observed.
Another type of methodological limitation was our reliance on VAA data. Much of the previous research on the
political elite relies on observable legislative behavior (e.g., parliamentary voting, proposing or backing a bill). One
could argue that such behavioral measures are superior to questionnaire responses, with the latter being subject
to various types of response bias (e.g., social desirability, response acquiescence) and, especially in the case of
VAAs, dissemblance and social signaling. However, we argue that responses to VAAs provide unique and in
many ways even superior information to that obtained by observing legislative behavior. First off, observable
legislative behaviour is often subject to strong institutional constraint (e.g., party discipline, rules, routine), and
may therefore often constitute poor cues as to what individual politicians actually consider important (Hall & Taylor,
1996). Individual politicians may only seldom vote according to their preferences without considering external
constraints such as the government-opposition dynamic and partisanship (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Manin, 1997). This
should give VAA responses the upper hand in helping us know the actual attitudes of the politicians. Although
strategic consideration could to some extent inform responses to VAAs, this is more likely to be the case for career
politicians running in national elections. Although municipal officeholders tend to receive a small compensation
for attending municipal meetings, the municipal council may meet just a few times annually. It is a part-time position
that typically does not interfere with day jobs. The private returns to being elected to a municipal council are also
negligible (Kotakorpi, Poutvaara, & Terviö, 2017). This implies that municipal election candidates tend to be inter-
nally motivated by their personal convictions and values. Morally convinced policy advocates have been found to
be neither capable nor willing to tailor their message in order to appeal to those who think differently (Feinberg &
Willer, 2015), suggesting that they would also not want to feign their attitudes when responding to public VAAs.
Finally, what candidates think that voters think will also have an effect on candidates’ actual attitudes – analyses
of the exchanges between party activists and online communities show that these exchanges have strongly influ-
enced the identity of the Finns Party (Hatakka, 2017).
However, one could also ask the more fundamental question of whether political attitudes matter. Although political
attitudes may not matter much from the perspective of day-to-day activities, attitudes may have a profound role
to play in shaping the party line. There are, of course, many political actors that affect party agendas, but it is the
politicians, the ambitious office-seekers, and office-holders, who have “created andmaintained, used and abused,
reformed or ignored the political party” (Aldrich, 1995, p. 4). Similarly, although institutions are important, it is
through the actions of individuals that institutions influence political outcomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Candidates’
attitudes are also likely to affect the attitudes of the electorate. For instance on environmental issues, it is the po-
larization of the US political elite that has led partisan identification to become an increasingly important determinant
of environmental concern within the American mass public (Guber, 2013).
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Increasing partisan polarization in the US political elite has been explained by institutional factors (Burden, 2001),
party activists (Aldrich, 1983), strategic considerations (for a review see, Layman et al., 2006), and the increasing
impact of social media (Sunstein, 2018). All of these could also help explain the results that we present. We ac-
knowledge that although we longitudinally record the polarization of refugee and environmental attitudes from
2012 to 2017, during which the 2015 European refugee-crisis occurred, we cannot really know whether it is this
crisis that caused the observed polarization. Other possible causes include the parliamentary elections in 2015,
in which both the Finns Party and the Green League can be considered to have won (Lönnqvist, Mannerström,
& Leikas, 2019). Election victories can radicalize both supporters of the winning party (Georgeac, Rattan, & Effron,
2019) and their opponents (Lönnqvist et al., 2019). However, the outcome of the fall 2015 elections, and in partic-
ular the victory of the Finns Party, was most likely at least in part due to the ”refugee crisis”, supporting our notion
that the crises can, even if indirectly, explain increasing partisan polarization.
Another possible explanation of polarization is the ever-increasing spread of political misinformation and propa-
ganda in online settings, the conventional wisdom being that “fake news” is amplified in partisan communities of
like-minded individuals (Pariser, 2011). The outcome of this process has been argued to be an increasingly mis-
informed and polarized society (Sunstein, 2018). However, recent results challenge the conventional wisdom;
exposure to political disagreement on social media is high (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Pew Research
Center, 2016), social media usage does not increase polarization (Boxell, Gentzkow, & Shapiro, 2017), and mis-
information appears to have only limited effects on political knowledge (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). More generally,
the current consensus is that it is the behavior of the party elites, not media communication, which is responsible
for partisan polarization of the mass public (Arceneaux & Johnson, 2015).
We acknowledge that our paper is descriptive, and we cannot really be certain of what the most powerful under-
lying causal factors driving the polarization of the political elite are. Similarly, we do not know which social psycho-
logical mechanisms are at play. There is thus clearly need for work that would try to establish both the societal
and psychological factors underlying the observed polarization of the political elite.
Is There an Intrinsic Relationship Between Environmental and Migrant Attitudes?
One could easily imagine Finns Party candidates that cared more about Finnish nature. For instance, the “Maiden
of Finland” used as the symbol of independence and the ‘purity’ of the nation is typically portrayed against the
landscape "of the thousand lakes" also functions as a symbol of Finnish nature (Reitala, 1983). On the surface
level, there seems to be no straightforward connection between being anti-refugee and being less environmentally
concerned. Consistent with this, our results suggesting increased issue alignment imply that also the association
between refugee and environmental attitudes is at least to some extent shaped by the political discourse. However,
there was a consistent positive correlation between refugee and environmental attitudes, with the strength of the
association varying between .08 and .25 across parties. This implies that besides the influence of political discourse
on the structuring of attitudes (people learn what goes with what), there could also be a deeper connection between
immigration attitudes and environmental attitudes.
Both positive attitudes towards immigrants and protecting the environment define Universalism values - personal
values that motivate understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for
nature (Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet, & Schmidt, 2008; Schwartz, Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000). The structure of per-
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sonal values has been suggested to be universal (Schwartz, 1994), and personal values have been argued to
organize and shape political attitudes (Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010). If, indeed, refugee attitudes and
environmental attitudes are intrinsically linked, for instance due to an underlying concern for others, whether those
others be people of different origins, people yet unborn, or nature per se, then a political climate that emphasizes
or denies the importance of others may either help or hurt both refugee and environmental attitudes. Values are
also often thought to form a circular system; actions in pursuit of one value may contribute to the attainment of
nearby values, but conflict with the pursuit of opposing values. Actions in the pursuit of Universalism are thought
to oppose Security values (protecting national and personal security) and Power values (having wealth and control
over people and resources) which represent self-focused values. Themotivational relations between values mean
that the increased importance of Power and Security values could decrease the importance of Universalism values,
bringing about less favorable refugee attitudes and less environmental concern. Supporting the idea that large-
scale global events, such as the ”refugee crisis”, could influence Security and Power values, these two values
became more important across Europe after the global financial crisis in 2008 (Sortheix, Parker, Lechner, &
Schwartz, 2019). The observed polarization of refugee and environmental attitudes and the dynamic relations
between these attitudes could thus be explained from perspective in which both are influenced by changes in
underlying values (for more research on value change, see Bardi, Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009; Maio,
Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 2009).
Not only personal values, but also other underlying psychological constructs could underlie an inherent connection
between refugee and environmental attitudes. For instance, social dominance orientation (SDO) and authoritari-
anism, constructs referring to the preference for social hierarchy and inequality (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), and
valuing the power of perceived authority over others, respectively (Altemeyer, 1996), are predictive of immigration
attitudes and of environmental attitudes (Stanley & Wilson, 2019). SDO was a stronger predictor than right-wing
authoritarianism and left-right political orientation on climate change denial (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014). The link
between SDO and lower environmentalism is consistent across countries (Milfont et al., 2018). Also Openness
to Experience, from the “Big Five” taxonomy of personality traits (Goldberg, 1993), predicts both immigrant attitudes
(Nieuwenhuis, Hooimeijer, Van Ham, & Meeus, 2017) and environmental attitudes (Hirsh, 2010). There are thus
are several constructs, emerging from different theoretical frameworks, that all refer to underlying psychological
individual differences dispositions that could serve to explain the connection between refugee and environmental
attitudes. However, the observed polarization of these attitudes and the dynamic relations between these attitudes
suggest the need for explanatory theories that can account for change, such as values theory (Bardi, Lee,
Hofmann-Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009; Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung, & Rees, 2009).
Conclusions
Despite the above methodological and interpretative limitations, our results allow us to conclude that political po-
larization in terms of both conversion and recruitment has occurred in the Finnish political elite from 2012 to 2017.
The populist radical-right Finns Party has become even more anti-refugee, and the adversary against which they
defined themselves, the pro-refugee Green League, has become even more pro-refugee. Parallel to this process
of attitude radicalization, refugee-attitudes have become more strongly aligned with environmental attitudes, and
the Finns Party has moved in a more anti-environmental direction. To the best of our knowledge, the present re-
search is the first to employ longitudinal data to investigate the attitude polarization of individuals belonging to the
political elite. Following the same sample of people over time allowed us to observe change more accurately than
what is possible with cross-sectional designs, which inevitably raise questions concerning underlying differences
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between the groups that are being compared over time. There is, to the best of our knowledge, also no previous
longitudinal data that would document the increased issue alignment and increased within-party homogeneity of
the political elite. Finally, there is still very little research that would span over the years in which the “refugee crisis”
occurred. We also know of no other research that would investigate polarization in the opponents of the radical-
right. Whether similar patterns of change can be observed in other contexts should be investigated.
More generally, there is a vast amount of research documenting the polarization of the US political elite since the
1970s, but very little on polarization in other countries. We argue that the observed polarization is due to the 2015
European ”refugee crisis”, but this is difficult to ascertain. Whether the epithet “crisis” is warranted can be questioned,
as all parties except the Finns Party moved in a more pro-refugee direction, suggesting at least some degree of
confidence in coping with the 2015 influx of refugees. One alarming aspect of this research is the observed decrease
in pro-environmental attitudes, which was especially strong in the Finns Party but also found in other conservative
parties. Whether increased issue alignment between refugee and environmental attitudes can be found in other
contexts, and whether the populist far-right movements across the West are generally moving in an anti-environ-
mental direction, are urgent questions to address in cross-national datasets. It seems that environmental policy
could be becoming an increasingly partisan issue, which could have dire consequences for the planet.
Notes
i) An alternative, arguably more intuitive strategy for testing Hypothesis 2 would have been to test whether the correlations
between refugee and environmental attitudes increase across time. Testing for differences between correlations would give
results virtually identical to those we present, but our method gives more reliable results according to simulations that we ran
(see SOM). We thus prefer to present the pre-registered correlated change analyses. The correlated change analyses also
has more statistical power, and allows for better handling of missing data (see SOM).
ii) In the pre-registration, it was stated that “the models for each party are just identified with zero degrees of freedom. Thus,
the hypotheses are tested from parameter estimates, not from model fits.”, but this is incorrect regarding Hypothesis 1 and 2.
Due to not modeling bivariate correlations between baseline and change scores of refugee and environmental attitudes, nor
covariate intercepts, the models were overidentified, allowing us to examine also model fit. The interpretations are nevertheless
based on the parameter estimates, given at least acceptable fit of the model.
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